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South Korea's Experience with External Debt
Abstract
This paper examines South Korea's macroeconomic performance and
experience with external debt during 1960-1986. Most of Korea's debt was
accumulated during three periods: 1966-69, 1974-75 and 1979-81. Each
involved an initial phase of economic difficulty and an slow-down in growth,
followed by an impressive recovery. The paper reviews the economic and
political developments during each cycle in some detail, Of particular
interest are the shifts in economic policy as domestic authorities responded
to external and internal developments. The paper is part of a larger study
of the Korean experience.
Susan M. Collins
Department of Economics
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J,. Introduction
This paper examines South Korea's macroeconomic performance and
experience with external debt frot the early 1960s to 1986. Most of Korea's
debt was accumulated during one of three periods: 1966-69, 1974-75 or 1979-81
(Table I) . Each period can be characterized as a cycle in which an initial
phase of economic difficulty and growth slow-down was followed by a
subsequent recovery with resumed growth. As we shall see, only the economic
downturn during the third cycle was severe enough to be classified as a
crisis by international standards. However, all three declines in
performance were viewed with concern by Korean policy makers. Each of the
three cycles also involved important shifts in economic policy as domestic
authorities responded to external developments and to changes in domestic
macroeconomic performance.
The primary purpose of this paper is to review the economic and
political developments during each cycle of debt accumulation, difficulty and
recovery. The paper is part of a larger analysis of Korea's experience, and
:nrour.out tie aIscussLon, readers are referred to ocher parts oi che larger
study.
While it is convenient to discuss each cycle separately, it is also
i.mportant to identify the broad trends which developed throughout Korea's
recent history. In particular, when we pick up the story, Korea is a war
devastated economy heavily dependent on foreign aid. By 1986, she had
successfully weathered the international debt crisis. In sharp contrast to
most other developing country debtors in which policy has remained focused on
macroeconomic stabilization (balance of payments and/or prices) , Korean
1
policy focus had returned to the issues of long term growth and structuraL
development. The major external "problem' was a large current account
surpLus - a problem which placed Korea policy debates much closer to those of
Japan than to chose of other debtor countries.
II. Economic Growth and External BorrowinR (1960-73)
Korea's first cycle of debt accumulation, crisis and recovery coincides
with a number of changes in the Korean economy. First, shifts in economic
policies following the 1961 military coup have generally been identified as
the beginning of Korea's "export oriented growth", with rapid. expansions of
both exports and GNP. Second, the period follows shortly after the decline
in grants and military aid from the U.S., and the subsequent push for
substitute funding by the Korean government.
Third, the growth rate of the Korean capital stock accelerates markedly
after 1966 following the relatively slow growth during the period from
1953-1966. On the one hand, the growth rates of exports and GNP responded
very favorably, jumping from annual averages of 8% and 3% respectively during
1953-1966 to 37 and 10% during 1966-1970 Ac the same time. afLar.in :atas
remained stable but quite high (l5-L6%). The period is characterized by
rapidly increasing empLoyment, increases in both manufacturing wages and farm
incomes and rising wage-rental ratios. On the ocher hand, investment
exceeded domescic savings. despite :ne rise in savings aLIOWLng the _7b
financial reforms. Korea ran large current account deficits during the
period from 1965 to 1969, and financed the deficits by external borrowing.
As a share of GNP, debt rose from 6.9% in 1965 to 27.2% in 1969.
Severe problems had emerged by 1970. The contributing factors included
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a sharp drop in private savings rates, an overvalued exchange rate, and
rising unit labor costs. By 1973, however, the economy was booming.
We begin with a background review of developments during 1960-1965.
Section 8 gives an analysis of the debt accumulation period from 1966-1969
leading up to the crisis. Section C provides an examination of the
components of subsequent recovery. It assesses the extent to which any
underlying structural weaknesses been addressed and the relative roles of
policy, luck and economic structure in the 1973 performance. The discussion
refers to economic indicators given in Table 2.
&,. Bacicround (1960-65)
1960-65 was a period of major transitions. At the outset, two critical
features of the economy were its trade policy of "import substitution of
nondurable consumer and intermediate goods behind the protective wall of
tariffs and quotas"1, and its overvalued exchange rate. Growth rates were
low, however, in contrast to the high inflation in the early 1950s, a
financial stabilization program (including quarterly ceilings for the growth
of monetary aggregates) combined with restrictive fiscal policy helped to
stabiLize prices Qurir.g :957-6:.
Political developments set the stage for a significant policy shift.
The April 1960 student uprising forced the resignation of President Syngman
Rhee. The new government, led by Chang 4von. collapsed following a rnilttarv
coup in May 1961, led by General Park Chung Hee. General Park was elected
President of a civilian government in 1964. The new government embarked on
I
W.T. Hong (1979) trade Distortions Emtloyment Growth j Korea, Seoul:
Korea Development Institute, p.245.
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an active, comprehensive policy of export promotion to encourage growth.
Although the policies have also involved some import substitution, and
although some measures were undertaken in 1961 (notably the unification of a
complex system of multiple exchange rates), we identify 1962 as the beginning
of the "export-orientation" phase of Korean development.
The corner stone of the new approach to economic management has been a
series of five year deveLopment plans. As we shall see, the plans have
involved shifting combinations of liberalization (particularly in the trade
regime), government intervention (most obviously through financial markets),
and concern over macroeconomic stability. The mainstay has been a desire to
maintain high rates of growth, This has been acheived through
increasingly high rates of capital formation in export industries. Except,
perhaps in the most recent period, this has placed stable, credible
incentives for exporters as a top priority.
The first 5-Year Plan (1962-66) targeted fixed capital formation to growS
at an average rate of 14.6%. However, domestic sources of financing were
limited, Domestic bank savings were small. Domestic commercial banks were
not "accumstomed or equipped' for long term loans, unless ordered to
undertake them by the ;overnment.
Nong • ¼2. 257' estimates that
short term credit for exports and long term credit for export promotion
amounted to only 3% and 1-2% of total bank loans
respectively. (He uses
medium Industry Bank loans and foreign
currency Loans to estImate total long
term loans for export promotion) The major source of domestic long term
funding, the Korea Reconstruction Bank, had access to only limited funds
through the government. Furthermore, the slowdown of aid inflows after
massive foreign aid during 1957-61 signalled a critical need for alternative
financing.
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The government had begun a concerted effort to encourage foreign loans
and investments in 1960. The Foreign Capital Inducement and Promotion Law,
the first of a series of new laws and regulations, focused on foreign loans,
foreign direct or joint investaents and capital and technology inducements.
It granted a number of special incentives, including special income tax
provisions for interest earnings arising from foreign loans. Foreign
investment businesses were allowed exemptions on income and corporate taxes
and on tariffs on their imports of capital equipment.2 In 1962, the
government instituted the system of guarantees to foreign lenders and
investors. Each private Loan or project was examined individually. Those
which were authorized also received a guarantee of repayment from the KOS and
80K, together with a guarantee of repatriation of funds.3
Two problems emerged in 1963: a resurgence of inflation and a
deterioration in the balance of payments. A number of factors contributed.
Macroeconomic policies had been very expansionary during the 1960-61 military
government - large fiscal deficits were financed through borrowing from the
50K. There were two poor agricultural harvests - rice in fall 1962 and
barley in Spring 1963. US aid flows declined substantially.
iuit:pl.e exchange razes were reintroduced during !?J and imoert
controls were tightened. However, it is important to note that incentives to
exporters were kept relatively constant during this period. A joint
2
Hong (1979) p. 141.
The allocation of loans is described more fuLly in Collins and Park,
Chapter 3.
C. Frank, K,S. Kim and L. Westphal, (1975), Foreizrt Trade r• mes an4
Economic Development: South Korea, New York: Columbia Unite v Press and
N.S.E.R.
S
US-Korea stabilization agreement during 1963-4 reduced the fiscal deficit,
introduced credit ceilings, and concrolled lending to the private sector.
It is also notable chat Korea began her industrialization with a period
of wage restraint. Real wages fell by over 10% between 1962 and 1964.
Available evidence suggests that labor productivity increased strongly during
the same period. (There are two measures of labor productivity. One gives
value added per employee. The other, produced by the Korea Productivity
Center (KPC), measures output per production worker. The two series do not
always tell the same story so that both have been reported.)
A series of reforms were instituted following the 1964 election. Under
US pressure, the exchange rate was devalued, and import controls were
reduced. Beginning in 1964, the exchange rate took on a more prominent role
in Korean economic management. Measures were undertaken to increase both
public and private savings. Partly in response to these contractionary
measures, 1964 saw an improved current account, a sharp decline in imports,
and reduced industrial growth. It also seems to have marked the beginning of
a more active role for unofficial financial markets.
In 1965, the government undertook a major interest rate reform. Some
au:zors na',e •n:ed tnjs as :rle reason for the dramatic increase in domestic
(private) savings in the late l960s, However, our analysis of savings in the
more recent period finds interest rates to be of little importance.6 This
This period is discussed in detail in D. Cole and Y.C. Park (1983)
Financial Development ft Korea: 1945-78, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
chapter 3. See also J. Curley, H. Patrilc and S. Shaw (1965), "The Financial
Structure in Kore'a", United States Operations Mission to Korea and R.
McKinnon (1973) Money and Capital ft Economic Development, Washington: The
Brookings Intitution.
6
Savings is examined in Collins and Park, Chapter 8.
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finding is consistent with Giovannini's conclusion that interest rate
elasticities of savings are are small in developing countries, and with work
by S. Van Wijnbergen.7
At the same time, diplomatic and commercial relations with Japan, were
normalized, generating a renewed inflow of funds which partially substituted
for the decline in foreign aid from the United States. For the first time,
commercial banks were allowed to issue foreign loan guarantees from 1966, and
a series of strong incentives were put in place for exporters to invest and
to borrow abroad.
to sunimarize, three critical developments had occured by 1964-65,
First, the shift to export promotion as the means to economic growth elevated
capital formation to top priority. Second, changes in government policy and
external environment had set the stage for heavy reliance on external debt as
a source of finance. Finally, the 5-Year Plans identified an important role
for government intervention in the allocation of resources, setting the stage
for government control over (organized) financial markets and therefore the
allocation of domestic and foreign finance. This was in marked contrast to
the period prior to 1961 in which the US played the major role in allocation
of foreign caplcai inflows. During i964-3, growth of output and exports aQ
resumed, the current account deficit had fallen to a manageable 0.3% of ON?
and the 1964 devaluation together with real wage declines had resulted in a
competitive labor foràe.
A. Giovannini (1983) "The Interest Elasticity of Savings in Developing
Countries: The Existing Evidence," World Development, July. See also S. van
Wijnbergen (1983) "Macroeconomic Effects of Changes in Bank tnterest Rates:
Simulation Results for South Korea," Journal Development Economics.
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Rapid Growth: 1966-1969
1366-69 was a period of high growth and stable inflation. However,
increasing external imbalance, and the rapid accumulation of external debt
presented potential difficulties for the macroeconomy. As shown in Table 1.
external debt jumped horn $392 million in 1962 (10.7% of GNF) to $1800
million at the end of 1969 (27.2% of GNP).
Many factors facilitated these massive inflows. On the foreign lenders'
side, risk was substantially reduced because of the loan guarantee system.
In addition, many borrowers received guarantees from their own domestic
governments.
Domestic borrowers were given strong incentives. In practice.
applications for loans to fund investment in priority sectors were
encouraged, and usually approved. As shown in Table 3, the interest cost of
domestic bank loans exceeded the average cost of borrowing abroad by 12.1%
during 1966-70, and loans from the curb market were considerably more
expensive. The real private cost to borrowing abroad was -2.3%. At a time
when domestic bank loans were strictly rationed, the 1966 Foreign Capital
Inducement Law introduced a more flexible process for foreign loan approval.
rocal Loan guarantees grew at an average annual race of 5% dur:ng this
period as compared to average growth rates of 30% for bank credit to the
public and private sectors. The foreign capital inflows sustained high
investment. Nearly 40% of total foreign loans during 1966-70 were allocated
to manufacturing, with another 40% to social overhead investments, 11% to
agriculture and 6.5% to services.
Gross fixed investment jumped from less than 15% of GN? in l96S to 20%
in 1966 and 26% in 1969. Table 4 shows that 83.8% of the increase in
external debt can be accounted for by the current account deficit. Reserve
8
accumulation amounted to 20.2% of the increase.
Three other developments occurred during the period. In 1967, there was
a liberalization of the trade regime as the government switched from a
positive to a negative list for restricting imports. Second, the 1968 Law
for Fostering Capital Markets was the first in a series of measures to
encourage public borrowing.
It is also important to stress the developing role of financial
policies. 1965-70 was a period of rapid growth of commercial and specialized
banks. Interest race subsidies on foreign loans also increased markedly
after 1966. Hong (1979, p. 260-61) estimates that tariff exemptions were
much less important than interest race subsidies on loans as an incentive for
inves cment.
Q Economic Downturn and Recovery (1969-73)
By 1969-70, Korea was faced with four major difficulties. The first was
the precipitous rise in the burden of external debt. Despite the exemplary
export performance, the debt service ratio (long term) escalated from 7.8% in
1969 to 18.2% in 1970.
A second difficulty was chat domestic savings dropped 'ow 3% of GNF
between 1969 and 1970. One reason cited for the decline is the reduction in
real interest rates as a result of increasing overvaluation.8 However, an
alternative explanation begins by pointing out that the real question may be,
not why savings rates fell in 1970, but why they were so high in 1969. In
8
Y.C. Park (1985) "Korea's Experience with External Debt Management," in C.
Smith and J. Cuddington, (eds.) International QkS Q Developing
Countires, Washington: The World Bank.
9
1970, savings rates returned to their 1968 leveL, and remained roughly
constant for three years. A sensible answer to the latter question is based
on the dramatic jump in real growth rates during l968-9. Domestic residents
may well have perceived these rates as temporary so that one would expect
little adjustment of consumption. In fact, this story also helps to explain
the 1974 "drop" in savings to 19.9% of GNP. Savings had jumped from 16.5% of
GNP in 1972, with a 5.3% growth rate, to 22.8% in 1973, with 14.0% growth
rates.
The third factor was consistently high investment, relative to domestic
savings. Although fixed investment declined slightly as a share of GNP
during 1970 and 1971, inventory accumuLation jumped sharply in 1969,
remaining high through 1971. Much of the 1969 increase in inventories was
accumulation of agricultural products arising from high grain imports, and a
large rice harvest, The increases in 1971-72 were primarily manufactured
goods, presumably in response to the increasing overvaluation, and expected
depreciation.
The fourth problem arose from wage and exchange rats developments.
During 1966-70, nominal wages rose by over 160%, implying a 65% increase in
domestic real wages. However the nominal exchange rate (won/$ depreciated
by less than 15%. The result was a deterioration in international
competitiveness. Measures of the extent of the loss depend on which measure
of labor productivity is used. Using the KPC measure, productivity rose by
L0L.l during the period, implying a L4.% rise in unit Labor costs, measured
Unfortunately, growth rates statistics for 1970 are not strictly comparable
with earlier and later years, because pre-1969 data are computed with
different base prices and the old SNA method. See the Data Appendix for
further discussion.
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in dollars. However, using the value added index, productivity grew much
more slowly, implying a 50.8% increase in dollar unit labor costs.
A series of adjustments were undertaken beginning in 1970. In
accordance with an IMF Stand-by arrangement, medium-term loans were strictly
limited, slowing the growth of external debt. Monetary expansion was also
tightened.
By 1971, a sLowdown in economic activity was evident. Real growth rates
declined, as did the growth of imports, particularly capital goods imports,
resulting in a dampening of capital formation. Authorities were reticent to
persue expansionary monetary or fiscal policies for fear of worsening the
current account.
In June 1971, the exchange rate was devalued in hopes of expanding the
economy without deteriorating the external balance, by stimulating exports.
After an initial 13% devaluation relative to the dollar, the won was
gradually devalued until June 1972 when the exchange rate was fixed at 400
wcn/$. There were also adjustments of the dollar vis-a-vis other major
currencies during l9723).0 In real terms, the won depreciated by 11.9%
during 1970-72, and an additional 15.6% during 1973. Nominal wage growth
jiowec. .onseauenty. aL:aou unit iaoor costs continued :o rise nen
measured in won, when measured in dollars, they fell by 19% from 1970 to 1973
using the KPC index, or by 5% using the value added index.
In fact, both monetary and fiscal policies were loosened during 1971-2.
Two deveLopments contributed to this policy shift. Agricultural production
(in particular, food grains) was low throughout 1970-73, with 1971 crops
10
The parities of the major currencies relative to the dollar wert adjusted
during 1972 and subsequently allowed to float.
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especially unfavorable. As a result, there were large deficits in the
government's Grain Management Fund, financed by domestic credit expansion.
Second, there was a financial crisis in 1972.11 Devaluation and export
difficulties forced many firms with foreign debts close to bankrupcy. To
avoid jeapordizing Korea's standing in international credit markets, the
government eLected to bail these firms out of their difficulties.
Outstanding guarantees on foreign loans fell in 1972, and few new ones were
issued.
The government instituted measures to restrict the expansion of the
unofficial financial market. The Presidiential Decree, announced on August
3, 1972, is especially notable because it reversed almost all of the
financial liberalizations instituted since 1965. The Decree replaced all
existing agreements between firms and unofficial lenders with new ones more
favorable to borrowers. For example, many short term high interest loans
were replaced by longer term low interest rate ones. The measure mitigated
the difficulties of many debt-ridden firms, and effectively shifted
adjustment to the financial crisis to the curb market. The unofficial market
almost disappeared in the aftermath of the crisis, and was not revived until
after :te 373 Jump in Oti prices.
Overall, 1970-78 was a period of slowed growth of the banking system.
Emphasis was placed on the partially regulated nonbank financial.
institutions, especially investment and finance corporations, which were
given incentives, and encouraged to grow.
In 1972, inflation accelerated and real growth slowed even further,
11
See Cole and Park (1983), especially pp. 158-68, for further discussion of
this period.
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despite improved export performance and the more expansionary macroceonomic
policies. The primary factors seem to have been, on the demand side, a drop
in private consumption, and on the supply side, poor performance in services
and manufacturing as well as agriculture. On the brighter side, the
substantial improvement in the current account position is primarily
attributable to export growth, and not to a contraction of imports. To
further encourage investment, the government took a more active role. On
October 12, 1972 explicit priority sectors were introduced for inducement of
foreign investments.12
1973 was an extremely favorable year for the Korean economy. Exports
and GNP boomed. The debt situation improved. The current account deficit,
relative to GNP fell even further, as domestic savings rates soared. There
was some decline in inflation, and the growth in real wages resumed,
exceeding the rise in labor productivity.
Why was 1973 such a good year? Three factors were the very strong world
economy, the lagged impact of real depreciation and expansionary
macroeconomic policies and the favorable private savings outturn. However,
an important point is that Korea avoided more substantial macroeconomic
scao1ization measures aecause )f its ajsr.orv 01 scructurat Lnvescrnents whi:h
enabled it to resume the high growth rates of the 1960s as soon as favorable
external conditions returned.
Q.. Assessment: $trenzths _ Weaknesses the Korean Economy in
.1.221
We end this section by asking whether the 1973 boom signified a complete
12
See Hong (1979), p.144 for additional discussion.
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recovery from the problems which emerged during the early l970s, or whether
underlying weaknesses remained. Considerable evidence (high and growing
investment with high rates of return, rising labor productivity, a
competitive real exchange rate) argues that it would be difficult to dispute
the very favorable prospects for rapid continued growth (though perhaps not
at 14%). Certainly, this was one important strength.
However, some aspects of Korea's structure left the economy particularly
sensitive to unfavorabLe external developments. Investment rates targeted in
the economic growth plans exceeded realistic forecasts of domestic savings.
The high investment and shifting economic structure implied increasing
dependence on imports of raw materials and capital goods. Furthermore, G4P
growth was closely linked to the growth in world demand for Korean exports.
Difficulties emerged when savings fell relative to investment. Given
the high fixed investment, the problem was overly variable savings and
inventory behavior. The larger current account deficit required additional
external borrowing, increasing the burden of the debt. The problem could be
exascerbated by external factors - namely higher interest rates or a world
recession which slowed the growth of exports. It could also be exascerbated
by incernai fccors such as a rise in the (pLanned) capital formation
component of investment. With variations, these are exactly the elements of
both the second and the third crises.
From this perspective, it is sensible to ask whether Korea would have
been better off overall by choosing somewhat smaller investment targets.
Potential advantages would have been a reduction in the sensitivity to
unexpected internal and external developments. With a smaller trend current
account deficit and less accumulation of external debt, the economy might
have been able to weather a jump in inventories or a drop in savings.
14
However, this view is misleading. The foreign borrowing contributed
significantly to the the growth of output. A ball-park estimate is that the
economy would have grown only half as quickly during 1961-71 without the
external finance, and only two-thirds as quickly during 1972.76.13 Frank, Kim
and Westphal (1975) reach similar conclusions in their estimates of the costs
of lower investment. It is economically sensible for an economy with very
profitable investment opportunities to supplement domestic savings with
external funds. During 1962-72, Korea very successfully encouraged
industries for export-oriented growth.
LI.L Ibi Second Period Racid Accumulation (1973-78)
We turn next to the second period of difficulty (1974-75) and subsequent
recovery (1976.78). Just as in the first episode, this period coincides with
a major shift in economic policy and a significant increase in fixed capital
formation,
At the beginning of the 1970s, Korean policy makers saw a decline in
competitiveness which, they felt, necessitated further structural shifts in
)r-er to maintaIn t'izure rowch prospects They felt tnac the ::sing reai
wages and capital intensity in manufacturing undermined Korea's ability to
compete in light manufacturing, and signalled a shift in her comparative
advantage towards higher skill-intensive and technology-intensive oroducts.
The U.S. decision to reduce the number of troops stationed in Korea
reinforced the desire of policy makers to invest more heavily in defense. As
13
See Collins and Park, Chapter 7.
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a consequence, a massive investment program was initiated in 1973 to develop
heavy and chemical industries (HG) The program remained in effect through
1979.
A primary difference between the second period of rapid debt
accumulation and the first is that, in addition to internal factors, the
economy was forced to adjust to unfavorable external developments - the jump
in oil prices followed by the slow down in worLd activity.
The major facts to be explained are as follows. During 1974-5, there
was a drop in real growth rates, a jump in inflation and a substantial
increase in external borrowing. During 1976-78, however, Korea was able to
resume her high growth rates and to improve her debt position. In addition,
there was some reduction in inflation at first (1976-77), but a resurgence in
1978.
Section A examines the period of poor performance, assessing the
relative importance of internal and external factors. Sections B and C turn
to the recovery period and to a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of
the economy in 1978, the threshold to the third, and most serious, crisis.
Throughout the discussion, we refer to the economic indicators in Table 5.
&. Ihi Problem Years (1974-75)
TabLe S shows that, in l74, economic performance deteriorated. By
Latin American standards, the outturn, with its real growth rate in excess of
3%. can hardly be called a crisis. 3ut oroan policy uakers were luite
concerned about the developments. The growth rate dropped by nearly 40%
Inflation surged to 24.3%.
Even more striking was the unprecedented increase in the r'.rrent account
deficit, which jumped from 2.3% to 10.8% of GNP within one year. External
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debt grew by 37% from $4.3 to $5.9 billion, However the debt-CUP ratio rose
only marginally from 31.5% to 32%. The debt service ratio fell slightly to
14.4%, substantially below its 1971 level of 21%. A more worrisome
development was the rise in the share of short-term debt to nearly 21%. It
is noteworthy that all of this rise was in loans to the banking sector.
Unlike short-term loans to the private sector, which fell between 1973 and
1.974, these "accommodating" capital inflows can be considered unplanned.
Total long term loans grew more slowly during 1974 than they had during 1973
- again except for a jump in long term loans to the banking sector.
Poor performance in construction and manufacturing accounts for a 4%
decline in CUP growth, with most of the rest due to slower growth of other
services. On the demand side, most of the slowdown is attributable to
14
exports.
The jump in inflation is not surprising. Domestic credit expansion
averaged 35% during 1972-73 compared to only 24% during 1970-71. There was
also a large shock from external price increases (oil as well as commodity
prices). Unit import prices rose by 55% between 1973 and 1974. In addition,
nominal wages rose by 35% (a real wage gain of 88%), while labor
orocucnvltv increases amounted Q CSS :an L2 cLess :be;n % using e
value added index). The rapid nominal wage growth has been attributed to
tight labor markets in the mid l970s, as the 'Big Push" created an excess
demand for many types of skilled labor.
The counterpart to the current account deficit was increased fixed and
inventory investment combined with a drop in savings (relative to output).
14
See Col.lLns and Park, Chapter 7.
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The rise in fixed capital formation was to be expected given the shift in
development strategy. As an indication of magnitudes of the shifts during
the early seventies, it is interesting to compare the sectoral aLlocation of
loans. Although the share of total foreign loans which went to manufacturing
feLl slightly from 39.8% during 1966-70 to 38.8% during 1971-75, the
percentage of these going to heavy and chemical industry (HC) rose from 57%
to 68%. Most of this increase is accounted for by changes in allocation
during 1973-5. It is also likely that investment to 1W during 1971-75 was
concentrated in L974, because investors anticipated a devaluation in the wake
of the first oil shock, that did not occur until December 1974.
It is interesting that fixed capital formation grew more quickly during
the Third S-Year Plan (1972-76) than targetted: 13.2% vs. 7.6%, Part of the
explanation for this may be the increase in residential construction between
1973 and 1974 which accounted for nearly half of the increased fixed capital
formation, the remainder being attributed primarily to increased transport
equipment.
A second factor was the decline in domestic savings. Park (1985, p.
304) writes that 'mostly as a reflection of the short run difficulty in the
acJuzmenc of onsun1ption zo Lower :eaL income, and oi a high race oi
inflation, domestic savings as a fraction of GNP plunged by four percentage
points to 19% in 1975 from about 23% in 1973.' Other authors also argue that
the large unexpected drop in savings was a major cause of the crisis.
However, as argued above, the high savings rate in 1973 was more out-of-line
than the lower one in 1974. The 1974 rate exceeded the average rate of 16%
during the less inflationary period 1968-72, and remained aproximately
constant through 1975. The main reason for the Jump in 1973 seems to have
been the unexpectedly rapid real growth.
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From a planners perspective, the more surprising outturn must have been
the unprecedented jump in inventory investment. 80% of the 1974 increase
came from accumulation of manufactures (including capital goods) and raw
materials. The large increases can be partially explained by the combination
of an imminent expected depreciation and an unanticipated reduction in export
15
growth.
It is also useful to identify the components of the current account
deterioration. A little over 20% of the increased deficit caine from a
worsening in the invisibles balance, primarily due to increased payments for
transport and investment income. 80% came from the trade balance. There was
the expected surge in imports. However, only 26% of the jump is accounted
for by oil payments. Another 26% was imports of capital. goods, and the
remainder was raw materials imports. Payments for imports rose not only
because of the price hike, but also because of a rise in the volume of
imports. At the same time, the growth of export receipts slowed relative to
1972-3, returning to the average 1966-72 performance. While the world
recession caused a reduction in the total volume of exports, the unit value
of exports jumped by 27% between 1973 and 1974, dampening the deterioration
in oreas :errns :raue.
To summarize the 1974 experience, Korean export growth was slowed by a
combination of the oil and commodity price rise and the ensuing world
recession. Slower export growth, in conjunction with the big push towards HC
industries resulted in a jump in investment (fixed capital formation, and
especially inventories of imported capital goods and intermediates) At the
IS
Park, 1985, p. 304.
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same time, savings rates fell from their temporary jump in the boom year of
1973. The result was an enormous current account deficit. The jump in
inflation rates came both from higher oil prices, and from rapid nominal wage
growth.
16
It was the beginning of the Big Push towards promotion of heavy
industries. The decision was made to continue this effort, borrowing to
finance the required imports instead of contracting the economy to adjust to
external shocks. 80K secured loans for the banking sector. Taxes were
raised to conserve oil consumption. Unlike the response in many other
developing countries, domestic oil prices were increased. The predeposit
requirement on imports was also raised. At the same time incentives for
exporters came from lowered interest rates and expanded access to export
credits.
In December, the won was devalued from 400 won/$ to 484 won/$, a rate
which prevailed until January 1980. The devaluation resulted in a 7.2% real
depreciation of the won relative to its average 1972-3 level. However, unit
labor costs, in dollars rose by about 4% during 1972-74 because of large
nominal wage gains.
Finaily, the Na:i,nai Investment Fund was createc in L974. i;s Durpose
was to generate additional domestic savings, and to channel them to targetted
sectors and projects consistent with the development plan. More
specifically, it was to mobilize employee pension funds. In encouraging
banks to make preferential loans, the policy marked the beginning of
additional government intervention in the financial sector through credit
16
The relative importance of internal and external developments is discussed
in Collins and Park, Chapter 5.
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allocation. As a share of bank credit, preferential loans were to grow from
40% in 1971 to 55% in 1976-7 and 70% in 1978. It is interesting that the
interest rate incentives to borrow abroad actually declined during 1971-75
relative to 1966-70 because of higher foreign rates, the depreciation and a
decline in domestic bank loan rates (Table 3). However, access to loans from
the domestic banks remained severely limited. The real cost of borrowing
abroad remained negative, -4.1%.
Overall, the situation deteriorated during 1975. The outcome was
slightly better in terms of inflation and the current account deficit, but
both remained extremely high. There was some further slowdown in real
growth. The situation was much worse In terms of external debt. Korea
borrowed an additional $2.5 billion, escalating the debt CNP ratio to 40%.
Although the debt service ratio remained at 14.4%, the share of short term
debt to the total jumped from 20.9% to 28.5%. In marked contrast to 1974,
64% of the rise in short term debt went to the private sector, with only 46%
going to "accomodating" bank loans. Similarly, most of the rise in Long term
debt went to the public or the private sectors.
The counterpart to the current account improvement was a decline in
inventory accumulation. This portin of investment remained h'Lh, although
the accumulation was concentrated primarily in agricultural and not
manufacturing products. Fixed capital formation rose somewhat, and there was
a slight further decline in the savings ratio.
The trade balance improved somewhat, primarily because of the small
increase in the value of imports. In particular, there was a substantial
decline in the imports of manufactures, offsetting further increases in the
prices of capital goods and oil.
It is not surprising that inflation remained relatively high as the
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impact of the December 1974 devaluation filtered into domestic prices.
However, nominal wage growth slowed somewhat to 27%, with the increase in
labor productivity growth remaining constant. With no additional external
shocks, and with a sustained moderation in wage growth relative to
productivity, inflation rates would be expected to drop further during
L976-7. One sign pointing in this direction was the declining growth of
wholesale prices - 26.3% in 1975 compared to 42.1% in 1974. The 1974-5 high
inflation was in large part a one-shot reaction to the oil price shock and
devaluation. This perspective, combined with labor market deveLopments makes
the rapid decline in inflation during 1976-78 less surprising. Fiscal policy
continued to be expansionary! financed primarily by external borrowing. Thus,
during 1975, there was no significant change in domestic savings.
Furthermore, the 1974 depreciation did not succeed in reviving exports,
primarily because of stagnant world demand, rising unit Labor costs, and the
resulting decline in competitiveness.
In summary, three major problems characterized 1974-5. The first was a
slowdown in growth of exports and CNP. The second was an unsustainable
current account deficit and the implied rapid accumulation of external debt.
Ci.irrent account deficits during these two years accounted for 93% of the
increased external debt. This problem was exascerbated by a worrisome shift
to short-term borrowing. Finally, policy makers were concerned about the
high rates of inflation.
B. Recovery jj976-78)
Table 5 shows the rapid recovery which began in 1976. Growth rates of
ON? and exports surged to 14% and 51% respectively, while inflation continued
to decline. Most striking is the drop in the current account deficit from
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9.1% to 1.1% within one year, and to 0.0% in the next. This section examines
how these dramatic improvements came about. It concludes with a discussion
of the state of the Korean economy in 1978, the year before the severe
1979-80 crisis.
The current account improvement during 1976-7 is attributable to a rise
in domestic savings as a share of income and to a decline in inventory
investment. On the other side, very rapid export growth, fueled by the 1974
devaluation and the recovery in world demand, contributed to an export boom
during 1976. Korea was also beginning to enjoy growing receipts from
construction activity in the Middleeast.
Thus, we can identify four factors which explain how Koreas current
account deficits recovered so quickly. One factor is the strong recovery in
world demand which stimulated demand for Korean exports. A second is the
increased fixed capital formation which expanded potential export production.
For example, •exports of chemicals plus machinery and transport equipment grew
from 14% to 24% of total exports between 1973 and 1978.17 Third, the large
increases in savings, attributable primarily to rapid income growth, enabled
Korea to finance the bulk of her investment domestically by 1976.
Finaily, Dv L978, cne negative impact of nigher oiL prices had been
dampened considerably by the inflows from Mid-East construction. Oil
payments had averaged $0.3 billion per year during 1972-3, while construction
revenues had averaged $0014 billion. During 1.974-78, oil payments and
construction revenues totalled $5.8 billion and $3.9 billion, so that 90% of
the additional oil payments were offset by additional foreign exchange
17
These figures are based on Customs Administration data.
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inflows from construction.
It is important to stress that substantial capital inflows continued
during this recovery period. External debt increased by aproximately $2
billion each of the three years. The real cost of foreign borrowing remained
negative during 1975-8. There was relatively easy access to foreign credit,
(including import financing and prepayment of exports). Domestic bank
credits, however, were subject to increasing restrictions.
Inflation fell from 29.5% in 1975 to 15.7% in 1977. As argued above,
much of the 1974-S junip in inflation should be interpreted as a one-time
adjustment to the terms of trade shock and to devaluation. Given an economy
without backward looking wage indexation, and given that import prices
remained stable during 1976-8, reduced inflation is not surprising. The two
issues which do warrant expalnation are first that inflation did not decline
by more, and second that it was reignited during 1978.
Two factors help to explain why inflation rates did not fall below 15%:
rapid wage inflation and rapid monetary expansion. Nominal wages increased
by 142% between 1975 and 1978, while consumer prices and labor productivity
rose by only 45% and 33%. The wage growth seems to have been fueLed by an
Lncreas:niv :ighc domestic labor market : parricular. the combination
the accelerating demand for labor from the Big Push and the reduced supply of
skilled labor to foreign construction projects pushed up wages in some
sectors, filtering across to wages elsewhere in the economy. The wage growth
together with a fixed nominal exchange rate implied deteriorating
competitiveness of Korean workers relative to her major competitors -
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan. It is noteworthy, however, that existing
data points to a deteriorating distribution of income during the late l970s,
following two decades of continued improvement.
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The monetary expansion arose both from domestic credit expansion and
from the foreign sector. The continued capital inflows and growing net
foreign asset position has been mentioned above. In addition, large deficits
in the Grain Management Fund were financed through money creation. In an
effort to promote self-sufficiency, the price at which the government
purchased rice grew 30% more rapidly than the price at which the rice was
sold during 1975-8,
The government became increasingly concerned about domestic inflation.
During the late L970s, a variety of price controls, ceilings and guidelines
proliferated. Prices in monopolistic and oligopolistic industries were
controlled by the government, which authorized all increases. As the
industrial concentration grew, these controls accounted for an increasingly
large share of the CPI. In addition, the prices of many essential products
were monitored by the government.
Nam claims that government pricing policies led to many problems
during the late 1970sj8 The "stop-go" approach to allowing price increases
created supply shortages, declining product quality, reduced investments and
distorted resource allocation during a time of substantial structural
raaajus:ment. Slack narcacs for some essentiaL consumer goods emerged.
There is a general consensus that 1975-78 was a period of increasing
misallocation of resources and increasing industrial concentration. 77% of
all investment in equipment in the manufacturing sector went to heavy and
chemical industries, although these industries accounted for only 55% of
total production.
18
Nam (1984), "Korea's Stabilization Effort Since the 1970s," Korea
Development Institute Working Paper N. 8405.
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The chaebol, large scale industrial conglomerates, became a significant
share of the business sector in the mid 1970s. Although they participate in
all sectors of the economy, they have been the most prominent in heavy and
chemical manufacturing. Statistics are difficult to obtain, however Jones
and Sakong (1980, p. 304) provide estimates for 1975 which suggest that the
46 largest chaebol produced 37% of value added in manufacturing, and 13% of
GNP, and that business concentration was increasing rapidly. tJestphal et.
al. state that
by "1980-81, the list of officially recognized chaebol had 26 large
groups, which together controlled 465 firms. Eight of these, along with
two public conglomerates, appear on Fortune's 1980 list of the 500
largest industrial corporations outside of the United States. One, the
Hyundai Group, was the lgest nonpetroleum corporation resident in the
less developed countries"
Financial and trade policies also became more restrictive during this
period, Financial market restrictions increased, credit rationing was
tightened, with preference given to NC and to large firms. Extremely high
corporate debt-equity ratios contributed to the fragility of the banking
sector - in the manufacturing sector, the debt-equity ratio rose from an
already high 3.16 in 1974 to 3,17 in 1979, and 4.88 in 1980. (It had fallen
to 3.86 by 1982. following a massive bailout, and the growth of Korean skock
markets.)
By 1978, the economic situation looked somewhat less promising. Growth
rates declined further, The current account deficit reemerged. This time,
the Lncrease was actribuca'ol.e to increased fixed apitai formation, Domescc
savings continued to rise as a share of income. There was also a jump in
19
Westphal, L.E. et. al. (1984) "Exports of Capital Goods and Related
Services from the Republic of Korea", World Bank Staff Working Paper. No.
629.
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inflation. On the positive side, the debt to GNP ratio declined, with a
reduction in the share of short term debt.
Thus a number of structural weaknesses faced the Korean economy at the
beginning of 1979. The major ones were the persistent imbalance between
investment and domestic savings, growing fragility of financial markets and
increased government intervention in trade, the financial sector and pricing.
Furthermore, the Big Push to heavy and chemical industries contributed to a
misallocation domestic resources and to excess capacity in these sectors.
DL. The Third Period of Crisis and Recovery (1979-86)
The final period of major debt accumulation, crisis and recovery is
perhaps the most interesting. It was certainly the most severe, including
one year in which output declined by nearly 5%. By 1983, however, high
growth had resumed, combined with substantial improvements in inflation and
external balance.
Korea's impressive performance stands in marked contrast to the majority
of heavily indebted countries, which continue to struggle in the aftermath of
multiple painful external shocks since 1979. The rapid and sustained
turnaround rI .corea s econouL1 ?erz3rmance as Seen wae 'J i:eu as a moce..
of successful adjustment, and held up as an example of the favorable outcomes
from the correct application of macroeconomic stabilization policies.20
For Korea in this period, just as in the two earlier episodes and just
as for many other countries internal developments combined with :cternal ones
20
Analyses of the 1979-85 experience are also given in Park (I' . l985b)
Dornbusch and Park (1986), Na (1984) and Aghevli and Marquez (1 "). Haggart
(1986) and Amsden (1986) contain interesting discussions of the ''Litical
economy of adjustment in Korea
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to create the economic crisis. By 1979, Korea was again in the midst of a
shift in the government's fundamental economic strategy. Performance during
1974-8 had convinced policy makers to step back from the Big Push, with its
reliance on widespread government intervention, and to refocus from
industrial policy as a tool to promote rapid economic growth to a growing
concern about price stability as a necessary precondition to continued
growth. The policy shift was confounded by increasing social unrest, the
assasination of President Park, and agricultural disasters during 1978-80.
On net, complicated interactions between internal and external factors makes
it extremely difficult to identify the relative importance of particular
elements in explaining outcomes.21
The discussion is divided into four remaining sections. Section A
discusses the policy shift embodied in the 1979 Comprehensive Stabilization
Plan (CS?). Section B examines the 1979-80 crisis period. Sections C and D
analyse the early recovery period from 1981-2, and the strong performance
period 1983-6. Throughout the discussion, we refer to macroeconomic
indicators in Table 6.
Policy aeocus 1977-fl
As government concern over persistently high inflation grew, policy
makers began to reassess the approach embodied in the Big Push. A series of
measures were introduced. During 1977, these included restraints on monetary
and fiscal expansion to contain aggregate demand. The government also
attempted to eliminate shortages through improvements in the distribution
21
See Collins and Park, Chapter 5.
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system (in particular, for agricultural products), increases in a number of
controlled prices and acceleration of import liberaalization.
Additional measures were undertaken during 1978. On the monetary/fiscal
side, short-term trade credits were discouraged in an effort to reduce the
contribution of the foreign sector to monetary expansion. Ceilings were
placed on credit to the private sector. Interest rates on bank loans and
deposits were increased, as part of a nationwide savings campaign. (In
addition, the August 1978 Comprehensive Measure to Curb Speculative Real
Estate Investment was hoped to shift savings from real assets to the banking
sector.) Government spending was reduced, in part through deferrment of
construction projects. On the trade side, the import liberalization ratio
was raised, tariff rates on some imported raw materials were adjusted so as
to absorb increasing prices. Limitations were imposed on the exports of some
items with domestic shortages.
The Comprehensive Stabilization Program was announced in April 1979..
This plan has been described as a "landmark"22 because it was the first
comprehensive stabilization plan which put control of inflation as the number
one priority. In the past, the government had been concerned first about
tnvestment for growth, and had consistently being willing to use external
and/or internal credit to finance real expansion, despite any unfavorable
implications for price stability. Furthermore, the Plan stated that
pervasive government intervention to direct economic development was
appropriate in the early stages, but argued that it was also appropriate to
22
See Nan, 1984.
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rely increasingly on market forces at later stages. As such, it accepted
part of the blame for existing economic difficulties. The new approach,
which combined proposals from 80K, KDI and the Economic and Scienticic
Council, was strongly supported by a newly appointed Deputy Prime Minister
(Shin Hyon Whak).
The CS? had four major components. The first was a more restrictive
monetary policy, including improvements in the preferential loan system,
and increased interest rates. In conjunction, fiscal policy was to be
contracted through a five percentage point cut in spending and additional
deferrments of large public investment projects. Third, the policy stepped
back front the focus on heavy and chemical industies by calling for a
reallocation of investment towards other manufacturing and nonmanufacturing
sectors. Finally, the government redoubled its efforts to prevent real
estate speculation and to increase the supply and to stabilize the prices of
essential commodities
B. The Crisis 1979-80
Macroeconomic performance deteriorated during 1979. Output and export
growth rates cnn;jnued teir decline Inflation rates remained high. the
current account deficit jumped to 2.2% of CNP, while external debt rose by
$5.5 billion, to 32.5% of CNP. 1979 was a year of increasing domestic
unrest. Partially in response to worsening income distribution, there were a
number of demonstrations. The situation culminated in the widespread
political uncertainties following the death of President Park in October.
Macroeconomic policies were relatively contractionary d'irr'g 1979.
Money growth was kept within the Plan's targets, and government expenditures
fell relative to GNP, leading to a reduction in the fiscal deficit.
30
The counterpart to the larger current account deficit was a jump in
fixed and inventory investment. Savings remained high. Like the story
during 1974-5, unanticipated slowdown of export and output growth helps to
explain the inventory jump, and subsequent external imbalance.
k large trade deficit accounts for most of the current account
deterioration. Higher import prices Led to a substantial rise in the value
of imports, while export receipts stagnated. Increasing real appreciation
and labor costs help to explain the poor export performance. Between 1978
and 1979, the real exchange rate appreciated by 9%, while unit labor costs
rose by lL%. (Nominal wages, real wages and labor productivity grew by 29%,
9% and 16% respectively, marking an end to the 1976-8 period of real wage
gains in excess of productivity and the beginning of a period of restrained
nominal wage gains.) Cumulatively, unit labor costs more than doubled during
L975-79 while the exchange rate remained fixed.
We look next at the declining growth rates.23 A simple accounting
decomposition on the demand side shows that, although there was a
massive (7%) reduction in the contribution of exports to growth between 1978
and 1979, this decline was offset by extremely slow growth of imports. The
net contribution of trade to growth remained roughLy constant between 1978
and 1979. On the other hand, the drop in the growth of fixed investment was
only partially offset by inventory accumulation. Total investment
contributed a full 3% to the reduction in growth between 1978 and 1979.
However, this simple approach underestimates the total effects from
external developments because it ignores resulting changes in endogenous
23
This discussion refers to Collins and Park, Chapter 7.
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variables. Our counterfactual examples using the KDI Quarterly Macroeconomic
model of the Korean economy imply that with no deterioration in external
conditions (ie. with unchanged oil prices, foreign prices, foreign growth
rates are interest rates) Korean growth would have been considerably stronger
(9% in 1979) while the current account deficit would have been 17% ($0.7
26billion) smaller.
1980 was a crisis year for the Korean economy. Real output declined by
4.8%. Inflation reached over 25%. The current account deficit rose to 8.7%
of GNP. External debt jumped from 32.9% of CNP at the end of 1979 to 44.7%
by the end of 1980.
Again there were both internal and external reasons for the 1980
outturn. There were two major internal developments. First, the death of
President Park created a climate of political uncertainty and social unrest
which is difficult to quantify. The second arose from the agricultural
sector. After poor grain harvests in both 1978 and 1979, the rice crop
failed in 1980. Grain imports increased
substantially during this period.
The sector's contribution to total GNP growth was -3.4% in 1980. In
contrast, agriculture's annual contribution to growth had ranged from 0.8% to
urtng L;7:-:T.
External factors included the terms of trade deterioration following the
second oil shock (there was a 17% decline between 1978 and 1981), the
slowdown in world economic activity and the increased cost of servicing the
external debt, due to the rise in interest
rates. Referring again to
simulations from the KDI QuarterLy Model, our results suggest that if
24
See Collins and Park! Chapter 5 for further details.
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external conditions had not deteriorated, real growth would have been
positive (5%), and the current account deficit would have been only half as
large (an irnprovemnt of $2.7 billion).
Three factors contributed to the inflation: devaluation, the oil price
jump and the gradualdecontrol of prices. The model simulaticns suggest that
inflation would have been about 9% points Lower in the absence of the
unfavorable external developments.
A stabilization package was initiated in January 1980, supported by a
two-year DIE Stand-by Arrangement. The exchange rate was devalued by 17% in
January, 1980. At the same time, a more flexible exchange rate regime was
introduced in which the won/s exchange rate was to be determined based on
external conditions, and on the value of a basket of currencies. During
1980, the (trade weighted) nominal exchange rate depreciated by 18.9% in
nominal terms and 9.7% in real terms. Domestic interest rates bank loans and
deposits were increased 55%25, and the higher oil prices were passed through
to domestic consumers.
The plan also called for a tightening of monetary and fiscal policy, in
the hQpes of counteracting the inflationary impact of devaluation. However,
conditions decerioraced during the year. Employment and output stagnated,
student demonstrations and.labor unrest increased in the Spring, and firms
were having severe difficulties in meeting their debt obligations, as a
result of the devaluation and the economic recession. The high debt equity
ratios contributed to the precarious financial situation.
In response,the government relaxed monetary and fiscal policy in a
25
Bank deposits did increase in the first few months after the ititerest rate
adjustment.
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series of measures in June, September and ovember. In June, interest rates
were raised 1-2% and domestic credit was expanded - particularly to small and
medium business, and to low income housing construction. Covernment
expenditures on social services were increased, and the target money growth
rates were raised slightly. The September and November measures reduced
selected taxes, reduced the interest rates on loans, and expanded credit for
residential construction.
Q..,. Early ecovery (1981-19831
Korea had weathered the two previous crises by borrowing extensively,
and smoothing the adjustment instead of contracting the economy. However,
policy makers were skeptical about the feasibility of this option. Their
debt stock was already very large and prospects for a quick recovery of world
demand for Korean exports looked din. Instead, macroeconomic stabilization,
and especially a reduction in inflation rates, remained the top priority.
The fifth Five-Year Plan, formulated in 1981, launched a major new
stabilization effort. It gave first priority to reducing inflation. In
response to dissatisfaction with the rote of government intervention in the
lntavoraoie economic performance, second prioricy was given :0 economic
liberalization.
The program included a wide variety of measures. Tax reforms reduced
individual income taxes, extended the value-added tax and restructured
corporate taxes, eliminating many special advantages. Price controls Were
eliminated. The number of restricted imports was reduced, as part of the
trade liberalization.
Again, the actual restrictiveness of macroeconomic policies varied as a
number of additional measures were undertaken during the year. In April,
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policy was loosened as additional credit was given to exporters and to small
and medium firms. In June, the government tried to further stimulate
construction. Interest rates were reduced by 3% (lagging behind the declines
in inflation) The government also began to rely more heavily on incomes
policy in an attempt to keep wages down.
There were some imorovements in the state of the economy during 1981.
In particular there was a one-year turnaround in the growth rate - the
economy grew strongly at 66%. A sectoral decomposition shows that
agriculture grew very strongly (contributing over 3% to the GNP growth rate
as compared to -3% in 1980), with some recovery in manufacturing.
Inflation fell from 28.7% to 21.3% within the year. However, the
current account deficit remained at nearly 7% of GNP, external debt had risen
to 48.4% of CNP, and a worrisome 26.1% of the debt was short-term. Inflation
remained high by historical standards. Furthermore, gross fixed investment
had fallen from 31.8% of GNP during 1978-80 to 28.9% of CNP during 1981.
A new policy package to revive the economy was introduced in January
1982. The interest differential on preferential loans was eliminated. The
money supply was increased stimulate investment. A financial scandal in hay
iY82 resut:ea Ln furtner credit expansion in order to bail out firms in
trouble. The growth rate of Ml jumped to over 45%. At the same cite, there
was little change in the fiscal position, and the real effective exchange
rate appreciated by nearly 4%. Furthermore, world demand stagnated.
1982 economic performance was mixed. The growth of exports fell from
26
A scandal in the curb market forced two large corporations to go bankrupt.
The incident triggered a contraction in the availability of curb market
loans, and many firms threatened to default.
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20.1% in 1981 to only 1% in 1982. As a consequence, there was a moderation
of output growth. (This time, neither agriculture nor manufacturing grew
strongly. Instead, construction and other services were the sources of
growth.) External debt rose an additional 4% of CNP to 52.7%. However, there
were substantial improvements in the current account and in inflation. The
current account deficit declined from 6.9% to 3.7% of CNP. We return to the
discussion of current account improvement with growth in Chapter 7.
Even more striking is that inflation fell from 21.3% to 7.2%. Three
factors contributed to the large drop. The first was the sustained slowdown
in nominal wage growth. Real wages had declined in both 1980 and 1982. The
second was a small terms of trade improvement. The third was a real currency
appreciation. Although the won depreciated against the dollar, the nominal
effective exchange rate remained constant and the real effective exchange
rate appreciated.
By 1983 the Korean economy was performing strongly. Real growth was
nearly 12%, while inflation had fallen below 4% and the current account
deficit had been reduced to just 2% of CNP.
Where did the 1983 boom come from? The simple accounting decomposition
CciLins and Par<, hapcer 7) snows chat orean expoc:s, Lnves:menc and
private consumption all grew strongly. The expansion was not attributable to
increased government spending. The sectoral decompostion shows that
expansion of manufacturing contributed nearly 4% points as compared to just
1.3% in 1982.
There had been some improvement in external conditions. World growth
had resumed - industrial countries grew by 2.6% in 1983 as compared to -0,2%
in 1982 and and average of 1.4% per year during 1980-81.
Increased international competitiveness enabled Korea to take advantage
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of the stronger world demand. Further nominal exchange rate adjustment had
led to over 10% real additional real depreciation since 1980. Domestic wage
growth had also slozed. Despite a slowdown in labor productivity during the
early 1980s, unit labor costs measured in dollars declined by 16.6% over
1979-83. During the same period, (dollar) unit labor costs remained roughly
constant for Hong Kong, and rose by 28% for Taiwan.27
Other internal factors had also improved. Many of the controls and
restrictions introduced during the l97Os had been relaxed. Agricultural
output had revived. In addition, the social and political climate had eased
considerably.
By 1983, Korea had dealt with the major economic difficulties from
1979-SO. Furthermore, macroeconomic stabilization had been acheived without
compromising high rates of capital formation. Investment had remained strong
throughout 1980-82, even though domestic savings did not begin to recover
until 1983. A critical point here is that Korea was able to continue to
borrow from abroad during her crisis period and that these funds were used to
maintain investment. It is very unlikely that Korea would have had this
option if the crisis years had been 1982-83. Korea was lucky in running into
difficulty before most of the ocner Gebtot countries.
fl Successful Adlustment (1983-86)
As a result of the very favorable 1983 economic performance, Korean
policy shifted away from a focus on short-run macroeconomic stabilization
(prices and the balance of payments) , turning again to issues of long run
structural development. The point is important in contrasting Korea's
27 These figures all use value added measures of productivity.
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experience with that of other developing country debtors. For most of them,
1983 was the beginning of the crisis. For Korea, the major adjustments had
already been accomplished.
The government launched a Revision of the Fifth Five Year Plan, to be in
effect from 1984-1986. The Revised Plan explained that the economy had
already acheived the major goals (price stability and renewed export and
output growth) set forth in the Original Plan. The Revision, "rather than
being oriented to quantitative targets, emphasizes institutional reforms and
structural improvements.., to make a major shift in the style of economic
management toward relying more on competition and market mechanism and to
solve the problems of imbalance. 28
The Revised Plan very clearly shows the policy shift to structural
adjustment and long term growth. For example, it states that Korea's
"remarkable (1980-83) performance has laid the foundation for another
economic takeoff" and that Korea was "forging ahead towards joining the ranks
of advanced industrial countries," (p. 3).
Against this backdrop, both monetary and fiscal policy were tightened
significantly in conjunction with a new IMF Program, in effect from July 1983
rugh :'1ar.: :56:. 5isca defic: as recuced jm -. NP in L62
to 1.6% in 1983, Ml growth was slowed to 17.0% during 1983 and 0.5% during
1984. The nominal exchange rate was managed so as to deprr kite the won by
5.7% in real terms from 1982 to 1984.
Economic performance remained strong in 1984. Growth exceeded 8%. The
28
Government of Korea (1983) The Revised Fifth jj Economic d Social
DeveloDment flj 1984-1986. pp. iii, 3.
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current account improved further as domestic savings rose. Inflation fell
below 3%.
In 1985, the ral growth race slowed to 5%. The development is
partially attributable to a s).owdown in world economic activity. The dollar
value of Korean exports grew by just 4% and exports contributed just 1% to
GNP growth, compared to 4% in 1984 and 6% in 1983. However inflation rates
remained low and the current account continued to improve. Korea's debt
position also improved. Short term debt, as a share of total debt, declined
from 26% in 1981 to 19% in 1985 and the ratio of debt service to exports
dropped from 57% in 1982 to 49% in 1985.
The government initiated further depreciation of the won in order to
boLster Korea's competitiveness. In real terms, the won depreciated by 6%
during 1985, and by an additional 15% in 1986.
1986 was a banner year for the Korean economy. Real growth reached
12.5%, inflation remained at just 2.3% and the current account registered a
$4.6 billion surplus (nearly 5% of GNP)29. In stark contrast to most of the
other debtor countries which experienced further deterioration in their debt
indicators,30 Korea's debt to GNP ratio felL from 56.3% to 46.8% as she
:aduced che aeoc stoctc y 32.L5 oL:.iion. Strong growni in :ie indus;riaL
countries, lower interest rates, a dramatic terms of trade improvement
(primarily from the drop in oil prices) and the substantial real depreciation
all contributed to •the impressive performance.
29
See R. Dornbusch and Y.C. Park (1987) "Korea's Growth Policy," BrookinEs
PaDers Economic Activjty for discussion of the "problems" associated with
Korea's current account surpluses.
30
See Morgan Guarantee, (1987) "LDC Debt Realities," World Financial Markets,
June/July for a review of the performance of the major debtor countries.
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Total Foreign
Debt
Foreign Direct
(nestment
Foreign Debt/GNP
Foreign Debt Plus
Direct
lnvestment/GNP
Debt Service
Ratio1
Table I
Korea's External Debt, 1960-65
(million of U.S. dollars)
Debt 1961 196? 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
83 89 157 177 206 392 645 1,199 IBOD
— 1 3 6 16 21 34 49 56
3.9 3.8 5.6 6.2 6.9 10.7 15.1 22.9 27.2
3.9 3.9 5.9 6.4 7.4 11.3 15.9 23.9 28.0
8.5 0.8 1.0 2.6 5.0 3.2 5.4 5.4 8.5
(continued)
—
Debt 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
7 .i.cj
;e,t
:772 1739 :57 5 ??2 L: ::: :: 7z7 . ::
Foreign Direct 81
tnvestment
117 15 329 486 549 650 741 830
Foreign oebt/GNP 28.7 31.2 34.0 31.5 32.0 4D.5 36.7 33.8 26.5
Foreign Oebt Plus 29.7
Direct
lnvestment/GNP
32.4 35.6 34.0 34.6 43.1 36.9 35.8 30.1
Debt Service 18.5
Ratio
21.0 16.7 14.6 14.4 14.4 12.1 11.1 13.9
'Includes interest on short—term debt.
Taole I (continued)
Korea's External Debt, 1960-85
(million of U.S. dollars)
(con t I nued)
Debt 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Total Foreign 20,287
Debt
27,170 32,433 37,083 40,378 43,053 46,762 44,510
Foreign Direct 866
Investment
873 975 1,044 1,112 1,222 1,456 1,891
Foreign Debt/G4P 32.5 45.0 49.0 53.5 53.1 52.3 56.3 45.8
Foreign Debt Plus 33.9
Direct
tnvestrnent/CNP
46.5 50.4 55.0 54.6 53.1 58,0 48.8
Debt Service 15.3
Ratio
18.5 20.1 20.6 19.8 20.1 21.4 "
Table 2.
Major Economic Indicators
1964—65 1966—57 1968—69 1970 1971 1972 1973
GNP Growth Rate 7.7 9.7 12.3 94 5.3 14.0
Export Growth Rate 42.1 35.4 39.5 34.2 27.8 52.1 98.6
Inflation (CPI) 18.1 11.0 15.5 15.9 13.5 11.7
Current Account (%CNP) 0:3 —3.7 —8.4 —7.7 -8.9 —3.5
—2.3
Fixed Investment (%GNP) s I 24.7 22.5 20.4 23.2
Domestic Savings (tGNP) H ri. 2O. . 'i'. L€. VI.
M2 Growth Rate 33.8 61.7 66.7 27.4 20.8 33.8 36.4
Budget Oeficit (%GNP) -- -— —- 1.5 2.3 4.6 1.6
Growth Rates:
Nominal Wages 20.3 19.9 30.6 26.9 16.2 13.9 18.0
Real Wages 1.6 8.1 16.9 9.3 2.4 2.0 14.3
C:)r
Valued added 2.9 3.9 13.3 22.3 13.9 5.0 5.0
(PC index1 13.2 10.9 23.2 12.1 9.6 8.8 8.8
Terms of Trade 84.6 97.1 101.0 100.0 99.2 98.7 93.7
Real Effective
Exchange Rate
116.1 104.3 96.0 100.0 105.6 114.1 132.6
won/S 263.0 269.0 282.0 310.6 347.2 392.9 398.3
tFrorn Korea productivity center, output per production worker.
Note: National income data prior to 1970 are based on 1975 constant prices, old
SNA. 1970—73 data are based on new SNA.
Source: EconomicS Planning Board and Bank of Korea.
TABLE
Cost of Foreign Cagital
annual averaoe; percent)
ltm l'c70 1971—75 17'a—80 1981—33 1fl4-35 NGt
Doriestic bark lenoing rate 24.4 17.0 19.0 12.5
Curb Naret interest rate 54.2 40.1 41.3 30.6 ,4 23.1
bForeign interest rate '.2 7.9 .3 13.3 L7
r
Ecbange rate depreciation 5.1 '.8 5.5 tO .9
Domestic inflation rate 14.6 19.9 20.7 9.9 3.8
GOP deflator)
tnterest rate differential 1.3
—14.5 5.
between home and foreign
markets HI) — 2) — (3)1
Peat private cost of
—4.1 —5.9 13.6 20.7
borrowing abroad -C42) + 1) — (4)]
a
Discounts on bills of Deposit 1oney Banks
b
Minetv—day LIBOR (london interbank offered rate)
r 3fl) f
.-orea 1noari .:anc?nrrt.:nre
ource: Bank of Korea, tb1y eYlk!ttD. various issues.
TABLE
of Eterna1 Debt
loo-o 70' 1c475 176—76 17—81 183-B5 1tt
I54 4136 638: 2:26:'
Current ACCOLnt t35 2L50 :910 1387 t6768 3366 —q7
Def cit
Foreign E:•chanqe 41L 484 507 2047
Ac u flu 1 t I on
Errors aM 1 —57 94 585 2406 :71.S 544
OflIssons 1—'
Direct FOreIgn --40 —231 —232 —308 —430 —522 —47'
Investment I—)
D,screency —b3 161 —93 1320 1469 2E93 —20fl
Bi11ins of U.S. dollis
Table I
Major Economic Indicators
(1973 78)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
GNP Growth Rate 14.1 8.5 6.8 13.4 10.7 11.0
Export Growth Rate 98.6 38.3 13.9 51.8 30.2 26.5
Inflation (CPI) 3.10 24.3 25.3 15.3 10.1 14.4
Current Account (%GNP)
—2.3
-10.8
-9.1 —1.1 0.0
—2.1
Fixed Investment flGNP) 23.2 25.6 25.3 24.4 27.3 31.3
Domestic Savings/GNP 22.8 19.3 19.1 23.9 27.5 28.5
M2 Growth Rate 36.6 24.0 28.2 33.5 39.7 35.0
Budget Oeficit/GNP 1.6 4.0 4.6 2.9 2.6 2.5
Growth Rates:
Nominal Wages ia.o as.3 27.0 34.7 33.8 34.3
Real Wages 14.3 8.8 1.4 15.8 21.5 17.3
Labor ?rcduczivit.[
Value added s.o 2.4 2.2 2.4 10.3 12.6
KPC index 8.8 11.4 11.6 7.5 10.5 11.9
Terms of Trade 136.2 110.9 100.0 114.1 122.0 127.9
Real Effective 117.1 101.1 100.0 93.5 94.6 97.8
Exchange Rate
Won/$ 398.3 404.5 484.0 484.0 484.0 484.0
1From Korea Productivity Center. Output per production worker.
Note: Based on new $NA method.
Source: Economic Planning Board, Bank of Korea.
MacroeconomiC and Pol icy
tFrom Korea Productivity Center. Output per production worker.
Note: Based on new Sfl method.
Source: Economic Planning Board. Bank of Korea.
Table '
Indscators (or orea: 1978-66
year 1916 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1985
GNP Growth Rate1 11.0 1.0 -4.8 6.6 5.4 11.9 8.5 5.4 12.5
Export Growth Rate 26.5 18.4 16.3 21,4 2.8 11.9 19.6 3.6 11,6
Inflation (CR1) 14.4 18.3 28.7 21.3 7.2 3.8 2.3 2.5 2,3
Current Account flCNP) —2.1 -6.8 —8.8 '7.0 —3.8 -2.1 '1.7 '1.1 1.3
Fixed Investment (GNP) 31.3 33.2 32.3 28,7 30.5 31.3 31.3 30.8 31.3
Domestic Savings (%GNP) 26.5 28-1 23.5 23.5 24.0 27.9 30.3 30.7 38.8
M2 Growth Rate 35.0 24.6 26.9 25.0 27.0 15.2 7,7 15.6 18.6
Budget Deficit (%GtiP) 2.5 1.4 3.2 4.7 4.4 1.6 1.4 1.0 1.8
Growth Rates:
Nominal Wages 34.3 28.6 22.7 20.1 14.7 12.2 8.1 9.9 9.1
Pea7 Wages 11.4 8.7 -4.1 —2.6 5.9 10.4 5,1 7.3 6'
.a:cr
Value added 12.6 16.0 -3.9 11-1 -1.8 4.2 12.0 -0.8 7.5
KPC index 11.9 15.9 10.5 18.1 7.8 13,6 10.5 7.1 13.6
Terms of Trade 117.6 115.3 100.0 97.9 102.2 103.1 105.3 105.9 11.7
Real Effective
Exchange Rate
109.0 97.2 100.0 103.6 103.2 110.6 114.4 121.2 139.2
Won/S 484.0 484.0 607.4 681.0 831.1 775.8 806.0 870.0 381.5
